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A NEW DEFERENCE TOWARDS EXCLUSIONARY
ZONING IN PENNSYLVANIA: APPEAL OF
M.A. KRAVITZ CO.
Suburban communities often enact exclusionary land use controls1
to prevent the increased residential development associated with urban
sprawl.2 Development of these exclusionary techniques is largely in
response to the fear that the migrating urban poor will overburden mu-
nicipal services without providing an increase in local revenue.3 Local
land use controls traditionally have withstood constitutional chal-
lenge,4 as courts analyzed whether an ordinance promoted the "general
welfare" solely in terms of the individual municipality's interests.5
1. Exclusionary zoning encompasses "the complex of zoning practices which results
in closing suburban housing and land markets to low- and moderate-income families."
Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use Controls, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 509, 519 (1971).
2. Exclusionary zoning takes many forms. Common techniques include lack of pro-
vision for or prohibition of multifamily dwellings, restrictions on the setback and height
of structures, and density controls such as minimum lot and floor area requirements.
These provisions have the effect of making new housing prohibitively expensive or non-
existent. Therefore, outlying municipalities may maintain their status quo by prevent-
ing migratory lower-income groups from establishing residences in the community. See
R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND USE REGULATION
AND HOUSING IN THE 1970's 3-11 (1973); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary
Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969).
3. See R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 2, at 3-11.
4. See, eg., Appeal of Key Realty Co., 408 Pa. 98, 182 A.2d 187 (1962); Swade v.
Springfield Township Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 392 Pa. 269, 140 A.2d 597 (1958). See
also R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 8.12 (1976).
5. See, eg., Appeal of Key Realty Co., 408 Pa. 98, 182 A.2d 187 (1962); Swade v.
Springfield Township Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 392 Pa. 269, 140 A.2d 597 (1958). See
also Comment, Do Girsh and Mt. Laurel Compel the Zoning of a Fair Share of Acreage
for Apartment Use? Pennsylvania Says Yes, 13 URBAN L. ANN. 277, 280 (1977). The
author stated:
Because zoning was to serve local needs, "general welfare" was interpreted to refer
to the welfare of the enacting municipality, not the welfare of neighboring areas or
non-residents. The restricted concept of the general welfare plus the presumption
of validity made successful challenge of exclusionary zoning in the courts nearly
impossible.
Id. at 280 n.21.
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During the last several decades, however, several state courts began to
consider regional housing needs in determining the constitutionality of
a challenged ordinance.6 Pennsylvania incorporated the regional con-
cept into the general welfare test by means of a per se rule that invali-
dated regulations having an exclusionary purpose or impact.' In 1977,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the per se rule in favor of a
test that sought to balance the needs of the region against the interests
of the individual municipality.8 In Appeal of MA. Kravitz Co.,9 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the new balancing test and up-
held the constitutionality of a partially exclusionary zoning ordinance
on the ground that the local governing body had given appropriate
consideration to regional, as well as local, factors.1 °
M.A. Kravitz Co. proposed a townhouse development for a ninety-
six acre tract of land in Wrightstown Township, a community on the
outskirts of Philadelphia." The municipality's zoning ordinance desig-
nated a forty acre site in another part of the township for multifamily
dwellings.12 Kravitz challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance,
claiming that the township, by allowing multifamily development in
only forty of its 6,491 acres, had created a de facto partial exclusion of
multifamily units. 3 The township's board of supervisors rejected the
6. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Berenson v. Town of New
Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975); National Land & Inv.
Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
7. See Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d
466 (1975); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 532, 215 A.2d 597, 612
(1965). See infra notes 25-43 and accompanying text.
8. See Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Adjustment, 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105
(1977). See infra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
9. 501 Pa. 200, 460 A.2d 1075 (1983).
10. Id. at 216, 460 A.2d at 1083.
11. Id. at 203, 460 A.2d at 1077.
12. Id. at 214, 460 A.2d at 1083. Kravitz' property was located in a R-2 Residential
Area that permitted only single-family detached dwellings, defined by the ordinance as
"a building designed for and occupied exclusively as a residence for only one family and
having no party wall in common with an adjacent building." WRIGHTSTOWN TOWN-
SHIP, PA., ORDINANCE art. 100, § 102.3 (1971), quoted in 501 Pa. at 204 n.1, 460 A.2d
at 1077 n.1. The 40-acre R-4 zone, on the other hand, allowed "multifamily dwelling[s]
constituting a single operating . . . unit." WRIGHTSTOWN TOWNSHIP, PA., ORDI-
NANCE art. 200, § 204.1(A), quoted in 501 Pa. at 204 n.1, 460 A.2d at 1077 n.1.
13. 501 Pa. at 214, 460 A.2d at 1083. Kravitz argued that the provision for multi-
family dwellings, which represented only 0.6% of the township's acreage, was wholly
inadequate to meet the municipality's responsibility to provide housing for the region's
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developer's claim and upheld the ordinance.' 4 The court of common
pleas affirmed the board's action.15 The commonwealth court reversed
and directed approval of the proposed development. 16 On appeal, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the zoning board prop-
erly had determined that the township was not a logical area for rapid
population expansion and reinstated the original decision upholding
the ordinance's validity. 17
The power of a municipality to control land use within its borders is
a function of the state police power.18 Zoning regulations, therefore,
growing population. Id. Kravitz's claim was similar to that accepted by the court in
Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975).
See infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text. The developer supported his argument
with expert testimony that the area likely would undergo significant population in-
creases in the near future if relaxation of the zoning restriction occurred. 501 Pa. at
215-16, 460 A.2d at 1083.
Kravitz argued alternatively that the ordinance totally excluded townhouses and
therefore was unconstitutional. Id. at 203, 460 A.2d at 1077. Kravitz alleged that
townhouses are a distinct use, quite apart from other multifamily structures. According
to Kravitz, because the ordinance itself defined "townhouses" and "multifamily dwell-
ings" separately, the R-4 multidwelling zone did not include townhouses. Id. Kravitz
asserted that the rule announced in Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970),
barred this total exclusion of townhouses. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
14. 501 Pa. at 203, 460 A.2d at 1077. The board of supervisors first dismissed Kra-
vltz's total exclusion argument after it concluded that the drafters of the ordinance had
in fact contemplated the inclusion of townhouses in the multifamily zone. Id. at 212,
460 A.2d at 1081-82.
The board employed the test developed in Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Adjust-
ment, 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977), see infra notes 49-62 and accompanying text,
to determine whether an impermissible partial exclusion existed. 501 Pa. at 203-04,460
A.2d at 1077. The board examined a number of criteria: the township's distance from
the major employment centers of Philadelphia and Trenton, the lack of major employ-
ers in the township itself, the absence of major highways and mass transit connecting
the locality with the rest of the region and the limited projected population growth for
the entire metropolitan area. Examination of these factors led the board to conclude
that the township was not a logical area for development. Id. at 214-15, 460 A.2d at
1082-83. Therefore, the township's 40-acre provision for multifamily housing was ade-
quate to meet the limited local and regional housing demand. Id. at 204, 460 A.2d at
1077.
15. M.A. Kravitz, Inc. v. Wrightstown Township Bd. of Supervisors, 32 Bucks Co.
L. Rep. 143, 146 (1978), rev'd, 53 Pa. Commw. 622, 419 A.2d 227 (1980), rev'd, 501 Pa.
200, 460 A.2d 1075 (1983).
16. M.A. Kravitz Co. Appeal, 53 Pa. Commw. 622,419 A.2d 277 (1980), rev'd, 501
Pa. 200, 460 A.2d 1075 (1983). The commonwealth court agreed with Kravitz's total
exclusion argument and held that the exclusion was per se unconstitutional. 53 Pa.
Commw. at 628, 419 A.2d at 229-31.
17. Appeal of M.A. Kravitz Co., 501 Pa. 200, 460 A.2d 1075 (1983).
18. R. ANDERSON, supra note 4, § 3.10.
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must promote the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare to fit
within constitutional guidelines.19 The United States Supreme Court
approved zoning regulations as an exercise of the police power in Vil-
lage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.2° The Supreme Court viewed mu-
nicipal regulation of land as an essential ingredient to the orderly and
safe development of the nation's urban areas.21 To ensure effective reg-
ulation, the Court warned against excessive judicial interference and
instructed courts to defer to the local legislative judgment in cases in
which the wisdom of a particular classification is debatable.2 2 Implicit
in this instruction is the notion that local officials can best resolve the
complex factual issues surrounding a particular zoning decision be-
cause of their greater familiarity with the locality.
Judicial deference to local land use classifications continues un-
abated in a majority of states.23 One of the notable exceptions to this
general rule is Pennsylvania, where the exclusionary zoning issue has
produced a more interventionist judiciary.24 This trend began in 1965
with National Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn.25 The ordinance
challenged in National Land required a minimum lot size of four acres
for single-family residential development.26 The locality attempted to
justify the restriction with evidence that local considerations and char-
19. Id. § 7.03. Modern courts continue to determine the validity of zoning plans,
like other police power measures, under the substantive due process test, whereby a plan
is invalid only if it is arbitrary, capricious, or lacking any reasonable relation to the
public safety, health, morals, or general welfare. See, e.g., Commons v. Westwood Zon-
ing Bd. of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980); Ginsberg v. Yeshiva of Far
Rockaway, 45 A.D.2d 334, 358 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1974), afl'd, 36 N.Y.2d 706, 325 N.E.2d
876, 366 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1975); Campbell v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 10 Pa. Commw. 251,
310 A.2d 444 (1973).
20. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
21. Id. at 386-87. According to the Court, the increasing complexity of urban life in
the first quarter of this century was likely to continue and necessitated some restrictions
on the use of private land. Id.
22. Id. at 388.
23. See D. MANDELKER, LAND UsE LAW §§ 1.13-.16 (1982).
24. See Comment, The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Exclusionary Suburban
Zoning: From Bilbar to Girsh-A Decade of Change, 16 VILL. L. REV. 507, 512-13
(1971); Comment, supra note 5, at 280-81. In addition to Pennsylvania, New Jersey and
New York have taken interventionist stances with respect to exclusionary zoning. See,
e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713, cert denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38
N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
25. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
26. Id. at 508, 215 A.2d at 600.
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acteristics precluded development at higher densities.27 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court rejected the township's evidence2 ' and found
instead that the primary purpose behind the four acre minimum lot
size was to bar the entrance of newcomers to avoid further burdens
upon the administration of public services and facilities.2 9 The court
declared this exclusionary purpose per se improper30 and invalidated
the minimum acreage requirement as it applied to the plaintiff devel-
oper's land.3 t
27. Id. at 525-32, 215 A.2d at 608-12. The township offered four primary justifica-
tions for the low density restriction: 1) higher density would burden the present sewage
disposal system; 2) any increase in population would bring increases in traffic---con-
gesting and damaging local roads and bridges; 3) further development would detract
from the area's historical significance; and 4) growth would preclude the township from
maintaining its rural character. Id.
28. Id. at 525-26, 215 A.2d at 609. The court first found the evidence regarding
potential sewage problems inconclusive, and found further that other legislatively sanc-
tioned methods, such as sanitary regulations administered by a sanitary board, were
better equipped than minimum lot zoning to deal with the problem. Id. As to future
burdens on traffic arteries, the court relied on expert testimony to conclude that the
township roads could accommodate the additional traffic accompanying significant pop-
ulation increases until 1972 or beyond. Thus, the court perceived the township's action
as an attempt to "deny the future," whereas zoning is designed to "plan for the future."
Id. at 526-28, 215 A.2d at 609-10. While recognizing the legitimacy of the desire to
preserve "historical aura" and open spaces, the court held that minimum lot zoning was
an impermissible means of achieving that end. The court stated that the township had
effectuated purely private aesthetic desires through public regulations. Id. at 528-31,
215 A.2d at 610-11. Finally, the court stated that development on four acre lots would
not preserve the township's rural character any more than smaller lots. Lower density
would simply mean "larger homes on larger lots." Id. at 531, 215 A.2d at 612.
29. Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612.
30. Id. The basis of the court's holding was that exclusionary motives were incon-
sistent with the constitutional mandate that zoning promote the general welfare. Id.
Although the court rested its decision on constitutional grounds, it made no reference
to a specific federal or state constitutional provision. See D. MosKowrrz, EXCLUSION-
ARY ZONING LITIGATION 187-88 (1977). Cf. South Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (the New Jersey Supreme Court
expressly stated that substantive due process and equal protection under the state con-
stitution formed the basis for invalidation of an exclusionary ordinance; specifically, the
court stated that it was offering constitutional protection to the interests of nonresidents
that desired to move into the locality), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
31. 419 Pa. at 533, 215 A.2d at 613. But cf. Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of
Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d 338, 414 N.E.2d 680, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180 (five acre mini-
mum lot size requirement not an unreasonable exercise of police power), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1042 (1980); DeCaro v. Washington Township, 21 Pa. Commw. 252, 344 A.2d
725 (1975) (five acre lot density restriction not per se unconstitutional under Penn-
sylvania law; challenger failed to meet heavy burden that provision was unreasonable).
Pennsylvania offers site specific relief, as opposed to total invalidation of the ordi-
1985]
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Five years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterated the Na-
tional Land rationale and concluded that an ordinance that made no
provision for apartment development was unconstitutional.32 In Ap-
peal of Girsh,3 3 the court stated that the ordinance's silence with regard
to apartments was equivalent to an express, total prohibition 34 and,
therefore, represented a conscious decision to exclude outsiders.35 The
court feared that judicial approval of this action would establish a dan-
gerous precedent whereby communities could legally foreclose all
housing opportunities in the suburbs.36
nance, upon a finding of an impermissible exclusion. For a discussion of the effective-
ness of this relief, particularly as compared to that afforded by the New Jersey courts,
see D. MOSKOWITZ, supra note 30, at 275-88. See also Hyson, The Problem of Relief in
Developer-Initiated Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 12 URBAN L. ANN. 21, 27-30
(1976).
32. Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). The court recognized the
important and distinct function apartments serve in the housing market, providing shel-
ter for those of relatively limited means. In addition, the court took notice of the fact
that lower-income groups had begun to move away from the urban core. Proceeding on
this assumption, the court held that the township was attempting to stand in the way of
the growing population. Id. at 244-45, 263 A.2d at 398-99. The court refused to allow
the township to accomplish this result through its zoning ordinance. Id.
Apparently because of Girsh's discussion regarding the validity of apartments as a
specific residential use, some commentators interpret its holding as one of per se uncon-
stitutionality for exclusions of distinct multifamily uses. See Pennsylvania Supreme
Court Modifies Exclusionary Zoning Rules, 7 AM. PLAN. ASS'N, PLAN. & L. Div.
NEWSLETTER No. 4, at 3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as NEWSLETTER]; Comment, supra
note 5, at 281. But see Appeal of M.A. Kravitz Co., 501 Pa. 200, 205-08, 460 A.2d
1075, 1079-81 (1983) (Girsh stands for the proposition that a locality cannot frustrate
population growth, not that it must provide an area for each architectural design);
Comment, supra note 24, at 528-29 (construing Girsh as a per se rule disregards the
court's intent).
33. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
34. Id. at 241, 263 A.2d at 397.
35. Id. at 245-46, 263 A.2d at 399.
36. Id. The court concluded that the area surrounding the township was experienc-
ing increases in population attributable to migration away from the large metropolitan
areas. Id. at 244, 263 A.2d at 398. The court then generalized this data, inferring that
the phenomenon was not confined to this particular case, and recognized the danger in
permitting one locality to decide that it did not want to bear any part of the growth
burden. Id. The court declared that the municipality could not make a zoning decision
that totally restricts population growth. Id.
In Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970), decided the
same year as Girsh, the court again demonstrated its increasing scrutiny of exclusionary
controls. In Kit-Mar, the Pennsylvania court invalidated the township's two- and three-
acre minimum lot size requirements. Id. The township's arguments in favor of the
ordinance were nearly identical to those advanced in National Land. See supra note 27.
In Kit-Mar, however, the court went further than it previously had gone to dispose of
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The focus of judicial scrutiny under the per se doctrine shifted when,
in Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court abandoned the intent test employed in Na-
tional Land and Girsh. As the court explained in a subsequent case,
proof of exclusionary impact would thereafter suffice to invalidate a
challenged ordinance. 8 The ordinance at issue in Willistown, like that
in Girsh, made no provision for apartments.39 Following the decision
in Girsh, however, the zoning board amended the ordinance to allow
apartments on eighty of the township's 11,589 acres." The court char-
acterized the amendment as a weak attempt to comply with Girsh after
finding the provision for apartments wholly inadequate to meet the de-
mand for multifamily dwellings.4" The court held that the municipal-
ity had failed to provide for its "fair share" of the regional housing
the alleged justifications. For example, in response to the township's contention that
local roads were inadequate to handle additional traffic, the court said that this did not
excuse the township from providing space for incoming residents, even if doing so re-
quired the construction of new roads. 439 Pa. at 472 n.5, 268 A.2d at 767 n.5. See also
Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975)
(court placed an affirmative duty on communities facing population growth to increase
municipal services to meet the needs of the incoming residents; locality could not disre-
gard its duty by enacting exclusionary devices).
The Kit-Mar court realized that its decision placed limitations on the zoning process
and its flexibility. Nevertheless, the court emphasized that until an effective system of
regional planning was in place, the judicial branch must deal with the problem. 439 Pa.
at 476, 268 A.2d at 769.
In Kit-Mar, the court clarified its interpretation of general welfare in the substantive
due process test to include regional interests. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying
text. While recognizing that its earlier decisions dealt with the interests of the individ-
ual property owner or developer prohibited from putting his land to a particular use, the
Kit-Mar court expressed its additional concern for and protection of the constitutional
interests of those "in search of a comfortable place to live." 439 Pa. at 474 n.6, 268
A.2d at 768 n.6. See D. MOSKOWlTZ, supra note 30, at 222-24, for a discussion of the
problems created by the Pennsylvania court's earlier failure to articulate precisely
"whose rights are at stake" and the constitutional source of those rights.
37. 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975).
38. See Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Adjustment, 476 Pa. 182, 192-93, 382
A.2d 105, 110-11 (1977).
39. 462 Pa. at 447, 341 A.2d at 467.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 448-50, 341 A.2d at 468. The court agreed with the developer that the
amendment represented "tokenism," designed only to give the appearance of adherence
to Girsh, and not actually to provide adequate acreage for the necessary multifamily
housing. Id. at 448, 341 A.2d at 467. The court apparently felt that a partial exclusion,
whereby a municipality reserves a very small portion of its land for multifamily dwell-
ings, should come under judicial scrutiny in much the same way as a total exclusion
because of its ability similarly to restrict housing choices.
19851
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burden.42 Thus, Willistown extended Girsh's prohibition of total exclu-
sion of apartments to partial exclusions.43
Willistown prompted a vigorous dissent.' The dissenting justice felt
that the local officials justifiably had concluded that the eighty acre
provision was a reasonable beginning designed eventually to meet the
region's housing needs. 5 The dissent also argued against second
guessing local authorities.46 In addition, the dissent attacked the plu-
rality for failing to explain adequately the impact standard or "fair
share" formula used to invalidate the ordinance.47 This ambiguity, ac-
cording to the dissenter, left the courts and communities of Penn-
sylvania without adequate guidance as to the exact nature of the
constitutional obligation to provide space for housing to accommodate
regional demand.48
In Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Board of Adjustment,49 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court attempted to answer the criticism expressed
42. Id. at 449-50, 341 A.2d at 468. The Pennsylvania court borrowed the term "fair
share" from the New Jersey Supreme Court's landmark opinion in South Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied,
423 U.S. 808 (1975). In Mount Laurel, the New Jersey court held that municipalities
must provide a "reasonable opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of hous-
ing, including, of course, low and moderate cost housing, to meet the needs, desires and
resources of all categories of people who may desire to live within [the municipality's]
boundaries." 67 N.J. at 179, 336 A.2d at 728. According to the New Jersey court, an
ordinance that did not provide for a community's "fair share" of the regional housing
need would not promote the general welfare as constitutionally required. Id.
In Willistown, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not articulate whether the "fair
share" principle announced therein followed the New Jersey model. Explanation of the
doctrine as established by the Pennsylvania court did not occur until Surrick. See infra
notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
43. 462 Pa. at 449, 341 A.2d at 468.
44. 462 Pa. at 451, 341 A.2d at 469 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 452-54, 341 A.2d at 470 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed
out that the board of supervisors studied the data and recommendations of regional
planning bodies prior to amending the township's ordinance. Id. at 453, 341 A.2d at
470. The dissenting justice concluded that the board diligently considered the regional
problem and developed a reasonable solution. Id. The dissent then criticized the plu-
rality for substituting its judgment for that of the local governing body. Id. at 453-54,
341 A.2d at 470. Moreover, the plurality improperly looked solely to the percentage of
land provided and invalidated the ordinance because the percentage appeared miniscule
to the court. Id. For a criticism of Willistown, see Comment, supra note 5, at 285, 289.
46. 462 Pa. at 452-54, 341 A.2d at 470 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 451-52, 341 A.2d at 469 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
48. Id. (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
49. 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977).
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by the Willistown dissent.50 The court explained that the fair share
principle adopted in Willistown was merely a part of the requirement
that an ordinance bear a substantial relationship to the general wel-
fare.5 ' As a means of implementing the fair share standard, Surrick
developed an "analytical matrix" to test the constitutionality of alleg-
edly exclusionary zoning restrictions.52 The three-part test required
balancing the severity of the exclusion against the likelihood and feasi-
bility of further population growth and multifamily development in the
municipality.
53
The first part of the test involved an analysis into whether the partic-
ular municipality was a "logical area for development. ' 54 If this initial
inquiry revealed a likelihood of expansion, then the reviewing court
was required to consider the existing state of development to determine
whether additional growth could occur. 55 The final step required an
examination of the extent of the exclusion created by the challenged
restriction.5 6 The court held that an ordinance is excessively exclusion-
50. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
51. 476 Pa. at 191 n.8, 382 A.2d at 109 n.8. The court labelled the fair share obliga-
tion an "analytical strand" in the substantive due process test used to determine the
constitutionality of all zoning ordinances. Id.
The court stated that the substantial relationship-substantive due process test, of
which the fair share requirement was now a component, formed the basis for its deci-
sions in National Land and Girsh. Id. at 188, 382 A.2d at 108. While the court con-
ceded that its application of the test in the two cases was unclear, the court stated that it
had "concluded implicitly that exclusionary or unduly restrictive zoning techniques do
not have the requisite substantial relationship to the public welfare." Id.
52. Id. at 194, 382 A.2d at 111.
53. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. Earlier commentators noted that
the active intervention of the Pennsylvania courts in the exclusionary zoning cases se-
verely restricted the discretion of local political units. See Comment, supra note 24, at
529-30. For the view that the Surrick balancing test, as compared to the earlier Penn-
sylvania cases, gives localities more freedom in the zoning process, see NEWSLETrER,
supra note 32, at 5. The article expresses the view that Surrick's more flexible approach
reduced the importance of Girsh as a rule of per se unconstitutionality. Id. at 3-5.
54, 476 Pa. at 192, 382 A.2d at 110. The court suggested that the locality's proxim-
ity to major metropolitan areas and the region's projected population were relevant to
this initial inquiry. The court noted, however, that it did not intend these suggestions to
comprise an exhaustive list. Id. at 194 n.12, 382 A.2d at 111 n.12. Instead, communi-
ties were free to examine any number of factors they considered important. Id.
55. Id. at 192, 382 A.2d at 110. This second step required an examination into the
township's present population density and the amount of undeveloped land. Id.
56. Id. at 194, 382 A.2d at 111. The court conceded that the determination of va-
lidity was more complex in the case of a partial exclusion. While a total exclusion
carried a strong presumption of unreasonableness, a partial exclusion required a more
thorough examination into the intricacies of the community's particular situation. Id.
19851
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ary if, on balance, the provision for multifamily dwellings appeared
"disproportionately small" in relation to regional growth pressures and
local conditions.57
Applying the balancing test to the facts in Surrick, the court first
found that the township's proximity to Philadelphia placed it in the
"path of urban-suburban growth.",58 Second, the court noted that ap-
proximately one-quarter of the community consisted of undeveloped
land and that the existing development was not of a high density. 9
Finally, the court analyzed the ordinance's provision for multifamily
units and concluded that a partial exclusion would result.' The court
found the exclusion unreasonable considering the township's high po-
tential for growth.61 The court, therefore, held that the township had
evaded its fair share responsibilities.
62
In Appeal of MA. Kravitz Co.,63 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
began its opinion with a brief review of its prior exclusionary zoning
cases. 64 The supreme court criticized the lower courts for interpreting
those cases, particularly Girsh, to require a municipality to provide
zoning for each type of residential use.65 According to the supreme
court, this misinterpretation created the assumption, held by the com-
monwealth court, that all exclusions were per se unreasonable. 66 The
57. Id.
58. Id. The township was 12 miles from Philadelphia and direct traffic routes
linked the two cities. Id.
59. Id. at 195, 382 A.2d at 111.
60. Id. The multifamily development provision in the ordinance was of 1.14% of
the township's area. Id. The court also noted that the ordinance permitted more than a
dozen other uses in the multifamily zone. Id.
61. Id. at 195, 382 A.2d at 111-12. The facts in Surrick, according to the court,
presented a situation that was "legally indistinguishable" from that found in Willistown.
Id. at 195, 382 A.2d at 112.
62. Id. at 195-96, 382 A.2d at 112.
63. 501 Pa. 200, 460 A.2d 1075 (1983).
64. Id. at 205-11, 460 A.2d at 1078-81.
65. Id. The court stated that the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, in a number
of decisions, improperly relied on Girsh as requiring provision for each multifamily de-
sign. Id. at 205, 208, 460 A.2d at 1078, 1079-80. The supreme court interpreted Girsh
to hold that the exclusion of population growth, rather than the township's failure to
provide for apartments as a separate use, made the ordinance unreasonable. Id. at 208-
09, 460 A.2d at 1079-80. The court attempted to reduce the applicability of Girsh to
future cases by stating that its reasoning was limited expressly to its facts. Id. at 206,
460 A.2d at 1078.
66. Id. at 208, 460 A.2d at 1080.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/10
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
supreme court added that the lower court improperly ignored the
newly developed Surrick model and, therefore, disregarded the decisive
issue of whether the ordinance's provision for multifamily dwellings
had a restrictive effect on population growth.6 7
The court then proceeded to analyze Kravitz' claim under the Sur-
rick balancing test.68 First, the court relied heavily on the findings of
the zoning board which had concluded that the Philadelphia area, and
in particular Wrightstown Township, was not likely to experience
rapid growth pressure.6 9 Second, the court noted that the township's
current stage of development had not reached a point that precluded
further growth.7' Finally, the court stated that the ordinance's provi-
sion of less than one percent of township land for multifamily use could
have an exclusionary impact.7 ' The court warned, however, that the
percentage of land available for multifamily housing was not the only
relevant factor; instead, the court stressed the importance of balancing
all factors, including local considerations.72
67. Id. at 209-10, 460 A.2d at 1080.
68. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
69. 501 Pa. at 213-14, 460 A.2d at 1081-82. The evidence, as presented to the zon-
ing board, focused on the township's physical location and characteristics. See supra
note 14. In addition, the board relied on a market study, prepared by a professor of
finance at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, that analyzed pro-
jected housing needs for the Philadelphia area and Wrightstown Township. 501 Pa. at
214, 460 A.2d at 1082. The board accepted the conclusions reached in the study,
namely, that the major metropolitan areas of the northeast, including Philadelphia,
were not likely to experience net population growth because of population shifts to-
wards the nation's "sun belt," and that Wrightstown Township, as a result of this trend
and based on its prior history, likely would grow at a relatively slow rate. Id. The
Kravitz court stated that "[b]ased on this and other evidence, the Board properly deter-
mined that the Township is not a logical place for rapid growth and development,
although some population expansion may be anticipated." Id.
The court's acceptance of the board's conclusion in this respect was crucial to the
resolution of the case under the Surrick model. The absence of significant growth pres-
sures, as found by the board, allowed the court to relax its scrutiny of the exclusionary
effects of the ordinance. If the court had disagreed with the board and instead had
accepted the developer's evidence, Kravitz would have presented a situation identical to
that found in Surrick. To maintain Surrick's vitality, the court would have been forced
to conclude that Wrightstown Township's provision of less than 1% of its acreage for
multifamily housing was unconstitutionally exclusionary. See supra notes 58-62 and
accompanying text.
70. 501 Pa. at 214, 460 A.2d at 1083.
71. Id.
72. Id. After stating that a court should not view the percentage of land for multi-
family housing in isolation, the court referred to Surrick's discussion of the relevant
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The township's zoning board, according to the court, gave balanced
consideration to these numerous and complex factors.7" On that basis,
the court upheld the board's determination that the ordinance,
although partially exclusionary, nevertheless was reasonable in light of
the township's limited potential for growth.74 The court was unwilling
to overturn the board's judgment on the basis of the developer's con-
trary evidence that the township would undergo significant population
increases if the ordinance offered more acreage for multifamily
development.75
"fair share" factors, which included local considerations regarding growth pressures.
Id. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
Analyzing the local considerations present in Kravitz, the court referred to the zoning
board's findings concerning the inadequacy of the township's roads and the absence of a
system of mass transportation. 501 Pa. at 214-15, 460 A.2d at 1083. The court cited
National Land and Girsh for the proposition that a municipality could not justify an
exclusion with evidence of inadequate public services. Id. at 215, 460 A.2d at 1083.
The court in Kravitz recognized, however, "that not all such services are entirely within
the township's ability to provide." Id. The court cited highways and mass transit as
two examples of non-municipal, yet necessary, services. Id. The court's discussion dif-
fered substantially from its earlier statements in Kit-Mar and Willistown that a munici-
pality had an affirmative duty to increase public services in proportion to the growing
population. See supra notes 28 & 36.
73. 501 Pa. at 216, 460 A.2d at 1083.
74. Id. at 214-16, 460 A.2d at 1082-83.
75. Id. at 215-16, 460 A.2d at 1083. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Ap-
peal of Elocin, Inc., 501 Pa. 348, 461 A.2d 771 (1983), contemporaneously with Kravitz.
The court once again employed the Surrick test and held that the municipality had met
its fair share obligation. Id. at 353, 461 A.2d at 773. The court's holding was based on
the fact that the township previously had undergone significant population expansion.
Id. at 352, 461 A.2d at 773. Thus, additional development and growth was virtually
impossible. In addition, although the court stressed that it was not looking solely to
percentages, 12% of the municipality's existing housing stock consisted of multifamily
development in the form of duplexes and low-rise apartments. Id.
In Elocin, the developer alleged that the ordinance's failure to provide for townhouses
and mid- and high-rise apartments rendered the ordinance unconstitutionally exclusion-
ary. Id. at 353, 461 A.2d at 773. In response, the court stated that the city in Elocin,
like Wrightstown Township in Kravitz, was not a logical area for development. Id.
Therefore, as in Kravitz, the partial exclusion resulting from the zoning restriction was
permissible. Id.
Justice Hutchinson, in a separate opinion, agreed with the majority that the ordi-
nance's failure to provide for higher density apartment buildings was not unconstitu-
tional. Appeal of Elocin, Inc., 501 Pa. 348, 355, 461 A.2d 771, 774 (1983) (Hutchinson,
J., concurring and dissenting). Thejustice, however, disagreed with the majority's opin-
ion as it related to the city's failure to zone for townhouses. Id. at 355, 461 A.2d at 774
(Hutchinson, J., dissenting). Justice Hutchinson applied the reasoning that he had em-
ployed in his dissent in Kravitz and reiterated his belief that an ordinance may not
totally exclude townhouses. Id. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. The
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Of the seven member court, three justices dissented.7 6 Justice Nix's
brief dissent, joined by Justice Larsen, warned that the plurality's re-
laxed scrutiny, in the form of increased deference to the biased zoning
board, effectively sanctioned suburban exclusionary zoning.7 7
Justice Hutchinson offered a separate dissenting opinion,7 8 premised
on his belief that the ordinance prohibited townhouses in the multi-
family zone.79 After he outlined the unique functions served by town-
houses in the residential housing market,8 ° Justice Hutchinson relied
on Girsh to find an unconstitutional total prohibition of a valid residen-
tial use.8 Justice Hutchinson then criticized the plurality's reliance on
the Surrick test and the fair share standard on two grounds. First, the
dissent argued that the complex determinations necessary to resolve
cases under Surrick were proper subjects for land use planners and the
legislature, not the courts.8 2 Second, Justice Hutchinson stated that
the plurality erroneously implied that an exclusion is proper, despite
the absence of a relationship to a proper zoning purpose, when a com-
munity is not in the path of expansion. 3
justice stated that the Surrick fair share test's distinction "between 'developing' and
'developed' communities" should not apply to a situation, as in Elocin and in Kravitz,
"where a municipality fails to provide in its zoning ordinance for a distinct and legiti-
mate use." Id. at 355, 461 A.2d at 774-75.
76. 501 Pa. at 216, 460 A.2d at 1084 (1983) (Nix, J., dissenting); 501 Pa. at 216,460
A.2d at 1084 (1983) (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
77. 501 Pa. at 216, 460 A.2d at 1084 (Nix, J., dissenting).
78. 501 Pa. at 216, 460 A.2d at 1084 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 216-18, 460 A.2d at 1084-85 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). Justice Hutch-
inson agreed with the commonwealth court's assessment that the "plain meaning" of
the ordinance, in its mutually exclusive definitions of "townhouses" and "multifamily
dwellings," precluded incorporation of townhouses into the R-4 multifamily zone. Id.
See supra notes 13 & 16.
80. 501 Pa. at 219-20, 460 A.2d at 1085-86 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). Justice
Hutchinson asserted that townhouses, in contrast with single-family and apartment
uses, "provide families of moderate means with the opportunity to own or rent econom-
ical dwellings which preserve some of the benefits of privacy, ease of access and open
space normally associated with single-family dwellings." Id. at 220, 460 A.2d at 1085.
81. Id. at 220-22, 460 A.2d at 1086-87 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). The dissent
disagreed with the plurality with respect to the proper reading of Girsh. Justice Hutch-
inson interpreted Girsh as creating a presumption that all exclusions fail to promote the
general welfare. Id. at 220-21, 460 A.2d at 1086. An exclusion is constitutional only
when substantially related to the general welfare as demonstrated by the ordinance's
proponents. Id. at 220, 460 A.2d at 1086.
82 Id. at 221-22, 460 A.2d at 1086-87 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 222, 460 A.2d at 1087 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). The determination
that Wrightstown Township was not a "developing" municipality under Surrick, ac-
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The vitality of Pennsylvania's constitutional limits on exclusionary
zoning is certainly in doubt after Kravitz.84  In the trilogy of cases
forming these limits-National Land, Girsh, and Willistown-the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court placed an affirmative duty upon localities
to provide housing to meet the needs of lower-income groups escaping
the central cities.85 Kravitz, however, implies that the fair share obliga-
tion disappears when a municipality is unlikely to grow rapidly. In this
respect, Kravitz ignores the rationale that initially led to judicial inter-
vention in the exclusionary zoning cases86 because the court failed to
cording to Justice Hutchinson, did not justify the exclusion of townhouses. Id. at 221-
22, 460 A.2d at 1087. The dissenting justice argued that substantive due process re-
tained its vitality as a restraint on a locality's ability to exclude-a restraint the court
could not eliminate. Id. at 222, 460 A.2d at 1087.
84. See NEWSLETTER, supra note 32, at 3-5. Fernley v. Board of Supervisors of
Schuykill Township, 76 Pa. Commw. 409, 464 A.2d 587 (1983), a case decided by the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court subsequent to Kravitz, appears to diminish the im-
portance of the earlier cases, particularly Girsh, even further. The zoning ordinance at
issue in Fernley expressly prohibited all multifamily development. Id. at 411, 464 A.2d
at 587-88. A preliminary issue facing the court was whether the Surrick fair share test
should apply because the case involved a total, as opposed to a partial, exclusion. Id. at
410-11, 464 A.2d at 587. The court held that the supreme court intended the use of
Surrick for both types of exclusion. Id. at 415, 464 A.2d at 589. The court then consid-
ered the evidence developed by the board of supervisors at the initial hearing and found
that no reason existed for disturbing the board's findings that the township was not a
"logical area for development and population growth." Id. at 412, 464 A.2d at 588.
The court held that under Surrick, the total exclusion of multifamily dwellings was
permissible because of the township's classification as a little or no growth area. Id. at
416, 464 A.2d at 590. The commonwealth court stated that "the Surrick opinion leaves
no doubt that an affirmative answer to the initial inquiry [as to the likelihood of popula-
tion expansion] is a prerequisite to a conclusion that the zoning is exclusionary." Id. at
414, 464 A.2d at 589.
Despite the fact that Kravitz and Fernley involve different types of exclusions, these
cases rest on the same rationale. Nevertheless, the commonwealth court in Fernley ex-
pressly declined to rely on Kravitz because the court felt that there never had been a
"clear finding" that Wrightstown Township was not a developing municipality. Id. at
415-16, 464 A.2d at 589-90. The Fernley court viewed Kravitz as explainable on the
basis of the justices' differing opinions as to whether a total exclusion of townhouses
existed and whether the exclusion was proper. Id.
85. See supra notes 25-43 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. In Kit-Mar, the Pennsylvania court
explained the underlying rationale of its exclusionary decisions:
If Concord Township is successful in unnaturally limiting its population growth
through the use of exclusive zoning regulations, the people who would normally
live there will inevitably have to live in another community, and the requirement
that they do so is not a decision that Concord Township should alone be able to
make.
439 Pa. at 474-75, 268 A.2d at 769.
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recognize that the absence of growth pressure may have resulted from
the zoning restriction itself."7
Kravitz represents a philosophical transition by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court from its activism of the past several decades to a more
deferential stance. The court's willingness to accept the findings and
conclusions of the local board increases the discretion and flexibility
afforded to local political units in the zoning process.88 Kravitz, there-
fore, signals a return to a more traditional, "Euclidean" theory on the
judicial role in zoning litigation. 9 While this retreat is an improve-
ment from the court's extreme intervention in Willistown 9 -labelled
by some as "judicial zoning" 91-the court's new approach may have
gone too far. Relaxed scrutiny, together with the inherent bias of local
officials to maintain the status quo,92 may result in the erection of new
exclusionary walls around the suburbs.9 3 Kravitz represents an attempt
to shift the business of zoning back to the individual municipality. In
so doing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may have removed the only
effective remedy to the exclusionary zoning problem.
Todd J. Aschbacher
87. The Kravitz court's refusal to inquire into the relationship between the restric-
tion and the expected lack of population growth is a clear departure from the court's
attitude in Girsh, wherein the court stated that "[t]he simple fact that someone is anx-
ious to build apartments is strong indication that the location of this township is such
that people are desirous of moving in." 437 Pa. at 245, 263 A.2d at 399.
88. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
91. Justice Pomeroy's dissenting opinion in Willistown, discussed supra at notes 44-
48, criticized the plurality for interfering without adequate justification in the munici-
pality's planning process. 462 Pa. at 452-53, 341 A.2d at 470 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
The dissenting justice felt that the court, despite its own prior warnings, had become a
"super board of adjustment." Id. at 452, 341 A.2d at 470.
One commentator concluded that the Pennsylvania court's heightened scrutiny had
eliminated most, if not all, of the discretion necessary to exercise effectively the zoning
power. See Comment, supra note 24, at 529-30. The result, according to the author,
would be haphazard development in the suburbs. Id.
92. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. See also Comment, supra note 24,
at 529.
93. Two dissenting judges took this position in Kravitz. See supra note 77 and ac-
companying text.
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